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O

n March 22 the Ninth Circuit released its new
opinion in Xilinx v. Commissioner, Doc 2010-6163,
2010 WTD 55-42.1 As has been expected since the panel
withdrew its original opinion, it reversed itself and in a
2-1 opinion held for the taxpayer.
The opinion makes it pretty clear why the reversal
occurred. It was the result of concentrated pressure by
the international tax community and the fact that the
government was unwilling to defend the theory on
which the panel originally decided the case: that the
arm’s-length standard of the section 482 regulations
does not apply to cost sharing.
Like Judge Reinhardt, I continue to believe that the
original decision was correct. As explained in my previous article, the cost-sharing regulations are an implementation of the super-royalty rule added by Congress
to section 482 in 1986, and Congress made it clear
when it adopted the super-royalty rule that the rule
was to be applied regardless of whether it was consistent with the arm’s-length standard. Therefore, the correct standard for deciding cost-sharing cases is not the
arm’s-length standard, which is not in the code but
only in the regulations, but rather the clear reflection of
income standard, which is embodied in the first sentence of section 482 and applied to intangibles in the
second sentence. Contrary to the majority opinion,
congressional purpose clearly supports the position the
panel took in the original opinion, not the position the
majority took now.
This conclusion is not changed by the application of
article 9 of the Ireland-U.S. treaty. As stated in the
original opinion, article 9(1), which embodies the

1
For prior coverage, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Xilinx and
the Arm’s-Length Standard,’’ Tax Notes Int’l, June 8, 2009, p.
859, Doc 2009-12396, or 2009 WTD 108-1.
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arm’s-length standard, is subject to the savings clause
and therefore cannot affect U.S. taxation of a U.S. resident like Xilinx. Article 9(2) is excepted from the scope
of the savings clause, but that clause of article 9 relates
to correlative adjustments, not to the arm’s-length standard.
It is a pity that the government was unwilling, presumably because of pressure from the OECD, to defend the position taken by the original panel decision
that the arm’s-length standard does not apply to cost
sharing. As the government cogently explained, Xilinx
and its Irish subsidiary could not be compared to unrelated parties because they are related, which makes
them jointly subject to fluctuations in the price of
Xilinx stock in a way that would not apply in an
arm’s-length situation. Therefore, comparables to sharing the cost of stock options can never be found, and
the arm’s-length standard cannot be applied. As Congress correctly decided in 1986, in the case of transfers
or joint development of intellectual property, a different standard must be applied — the clear reflection of
income standard that underlies the original language of
section 482 and the court decisions applying it in the
long period it was implemented before the 1968 regulations.2
What happens next? The government will presumably continue to defend its position on stock options
on the ground that it advanced before the panel,
namely that it is consistent with the arm’s-length
standard. Meanwhile, however, another taxpayer win in
a high profile transfer pricing case, together with the
taxpayer win in Veritas Software Inc. v. Commissioner, 133
T.C. No. 14, Doc 2009-27116, 2009 WTD 236-42, cannot

2
For the history, see Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, ‘‘The Rise and
Fall of Arm’s Length,’’ Virginia Tax Review (1995).
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locate most of their overseas profits in jurisdictions
with an effective tax rate of less than 10 percent, without paying any U.S. tax.3 It is time for Congress to do
something to level the playing field for small domestic
businesses that are subject to the full 35 percent tax on
their profits and that are our principal job creators. ◆

3
See Reuven Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing, and Michael
C. Durst, ‘‘Allocating Business Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split,’’ 9 Florida Tax Review
497 (2009).
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help but encourage other taxpayers to litigate rather
than enter into advance pricing agreements. The salutary effect of the Glaxo settlement (a significant win
for the government, even though there was no decision) is likely to be dissipated.
The taxpayers have won another battle. But they
may yet lose the war. The Obama administration is
advocating in its budget significant changes to the treatment of intangibles under section 482, and Congress
may well go along. The data are clear: Armed with
cost sharing and provisions like section 954(c)(6) that
enable them to shift profits to low-tax locations without triggering subpart F, our multinationals are able to

